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THE ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF PROSECUTORS IN CASES
INVOLVING POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE
JUDITH A. GOLDBERG* AND DAVID M. SIEGEL •
Recent developments in forensic science, particularly in the area of DNA
analysis, have generated a new body of lawfor defendants who allege that
they were wrongfully convicted. These innocence-based postconviction re-
view statutes, adopted now in thirty-three states, provide avenues for de-
fendants to obtain "new" or newly available scientific tests of "old" evi-
dence from their cases. These statutes are designed to avoid many of the
procedural hurdles of traditional postconviction relief and to provide a
comparatively simple mechanism for review. Despite this new body of law,
the reality for such defendants is that obtaining this type of review is often
extremely difficult. Defendants must litigate these new claims against
prosecutors whose primary objective is maintaining the integrity of tie
convictions, who may themselves have custody or control of both tile evi-
dence to be tested and the information concerning the evidence, and who
typically have superior resources. Tire promise of innocence-based post-
conviction relief is hollow unless prosecutors adopt new ethical obliga-
tions to guide their responses to such claims. We propose that when faced
with an innocence-based postconviction claim requesting tie application
of "new" science to "old" evidence, prosecutors should promptly seek tire
fullest accounting of the truth, effect tire fullest possible disclosure, and
use the most accurate science. We outline tile significance of these stan-
dards by reviewing the range of legal issues that can arise under these
new innocence-based postconviction review statutes, a series of common
counterarguments to the proposed standards, suggested responses to these
counterarguments and reasons why adoption of such standards is in the
interest of all members of the criminal justice system.
Law Clerk, Associate Justice Robert J. Cordy, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Ms. Goldberg spent two years as co-counsel (1999-2000) representing a Massachusetts in-
mate seeking postconviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing of evidence. The opinions
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I. INTRODUCTION
As scientists discover increasingly precise methods to identify the origin
of forensic material' and as the range of material that is forensically signifi-
cant expands,2 the criminal justice system is facing an increasing number of
requests by convicted defendants to subject "old" evidence to "new" scien-
tific tests.3 This issue has drawn public attention recently due to the number
of exonerations that have resulted from the application of short tandem re-
peat (STR)-based Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, including the ex-
oneration of a significant number of persons facing execution." In the past
1. The increase in precision is most notable with the advent of DNA testing. While body
fluids such as blood, semen and saliva have been of forensic significance for years through
serological testing, DNA testing has made these of far greater forensic significance because of
their ability to positively exclude, or with a very high degree of accuracy include, a specific
individual. By increases in precision, we mean changes in scientific methodology or tech-
niques that allow identification of forensically significant items with greater discrimination
and/or sensitivity. Whether the legal system recognizes a method as more or less precise is a
separate question, as the legal system may well even recognize as forensically significant
methodologies that are based upon subjective human judgments that lack traditional scientific
underpinning. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, et al., The Daubert/Kunzho Implications of Ob-
server Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problem of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL.
L. Rnv. 1, 6, n.17 (2002) (discussing the "sciences" of handwriting analysis, teeth mark iden-
tification and tool mark identification).
2. The range of forensically significant material can expand either because a new process
or technology allows items that could not be tested before to yield such information or be-
cause improvements in process or technology allow greater sensitivity such that smaller, older
and/or more degraded samples can yield results. For example, Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR) DNA testing is a process that is much more sensitive, in that it requires far less sample,
than does the predecessor Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) DNA testing.
Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, 76
WASH. L. REv. 413, 457 (2001) ("The fifth phase of the judicial evaluation of DNA evidence
is well underway. Harnessing the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) enables laboratories to
produce millions of identical copies of DNA fragments even from samples too small for
RFLP typing.").
3. We use the term "old" evidence to refer to evidence that has been in existence during
the pendency of the case. While some of the increase in the number of defendants seeking
such testing may abate as new technologies and methods become integrated into the original
pretrial investigation and prosecution (e.g., law enforcement authorities prosecuting those
charged with sexual offenses today often have already used DNA testing in preparing their
cases, while those prosecuting cases two decades ago might not have had the benefit of such
techniques), the ever increasing availability, discriminating ability, and sensitivity of tech-
nologies mean that the basic question will persist. Moreover, there are significant residual ef-
fects of a conviction even after incarceration has ended, so that individuals who are no longer
incarcerated may desire such testing. These include direct restrictions on liberty through a
term of parole or probation; requirements for registration-for example as a sex offender, a
range of other legal consequences, such as loss of voting rights, restrictions on possession of
firearms, and occupational restrictions; and deleterious personal and financial consequences
from the stigma, stress, and costs of having been a convicted criminal defendant.
4. The Death Penalty Information Center reports that since 1973, ninety-nine death row
inmates have been exonerated nationally. Of these, it reports that in eleven cases, DNA evi-
dence "played a substantial factor in establishing innocence." Death Penalty Information Cen-
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fifteen years, the legal system has devoted considerable attention to the legal
requirements for the admissibility of new scientific technologies or method-
ologies,5 and in the past four years, over half the states have enacted legisla-
tion addressing the availability of such testing.6 Nevertheless, the legal
framework within which defendants request "new" testing of "old" evidence
is still very much in flux. Although a majority of states now have some form
of innocence-based postconviction testing provision,7 the enforceability of
these provisions is often in doubt, and, in particular, whether the access to
the postconviction testing that these provisions afford creates a right that is
protected under the federal constitution.8 While federal legislation has been
proposed to create a statutory right to such testing in federal criminal
cases, 0 an avenue for federal habeas corpus relief in state capital cases for
persons under a sentence of death," and to establish financial incentives for
states to provide such testing in state criminal cases, 2 this legislation has yet
to be enacted.
ter, Innocence: Freed From Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocentlist.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2002). Thirteen death row exonerations in Illinois since 1987 resulted in
the much-publicized moratorium on executions in January 2000. Of these thirteen, DNA evi-
dence was the basis for exoneration in five cases. See Illinois Death Penalty Moratorium Pro-
ject, Thirteen innocent men over 100 years on Illinois' death row, at http://www.illinois
moratorium.orglexonerate.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
5. This attention has been the product of the Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997),
and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and numerous scholarly arti-
cles concerning these cases. See, e.g., Joille Anne Moreno, Beyond The Polemic Against Junk
Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm,
81 B.U. L. REv. 1033 (2001).
6. Mark Hansen, The Great Detective, 87 A.B.A. J. 37, 39 (Apr. 2001) (describing nine
states as having DNA postconviction testing and/or evidence preservation statutes, with simi-
lar legislation pending in eighteen other states and at the federal level).
7. We use the term "innocence-based" postconviction testing to denote this new body of
law that is separate from traditional forms of postconviction review, such as a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. See discussion infra Part I. We also distinguish these statutes from a
"bare innocence" claim for postconviction relief under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993) (deciding that claim of "actual innocence" does not entitle habeas petitioner to relief).
8. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 380 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding no federal constitu-
tional right, under the 14th Amendment's due process clause, to postconviction DNA testing).
But see Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2002), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied,
(Luttig, J., concurring) (holding constitutional right to postconviction access to evidence for
purposes of STR-based DNA testing).
9. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S.B. 486 and H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001) [here-
inafter "Act" or "Senate Bill 486"]. The provisions of these bills are identical. Section refer-
ences are to House Bill 912.
10. Act § 102 provides for postconviction testing in federal criminal cases.
11. Act § 104(a)-(b). House Bill 912 prohibits denials of access to testing, under either
state time limits or procedural default rules, or as a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, for persons under sentence of death pursuant to Congress' powers to enforce the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under section 5. See generally Larry Yackle, Congres-
sional Power to Require DNA Testing, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1173 (2001) (arguing Congress
has the power, under section 5 of the 14th Amendment, to require DNA testing).
12. Act § 103 conditions federal assistance to states for establishment of DNA databanks
[Vol. 38
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Yet while these scientific developments have changed the law in some
respects, 3 the system in which these claims are brought is still the same sys-
tem that led to the original convictions. In other words, the forum for these
new postconviction claims of innocence has not changed; they are still liti-
gated in the same adversarial system in which all other postconviction
claims, as well as the original criminal cases, are litigated. In this adversarial
system, the "old" evidence that might be subject to such "new" testing is of-
tentimes in the control or custody of law enforcement authorities.
Furthermore, information about the case, and thus information about the po-
tential significance of the evidence, is in the control of law enforcement au-
thorities, the prosecutor, or both. Moreover, defendants must make a show-
ing about the evidentiary significance of evidence before such evidence may
be subjected to new tests. This adversarial system, except in unusual circum-
stances, still reflects a resource imbalance favoring the government over the
convicted defendant.
While the existence of innocence-based postconviction statutes in the-
ory establishes a means of obtaining review, these statutes contain or raise
numerous issues that prosecutors may view as a source of litigation when a
defendant seeks testing.' Thus, even if there is a legal mechanism for a de-
fendant to obtain testing in support of a postconviction claim of innocence,
the efficiency, ease, and possibly the likelihood of success of such an effort
can be dramatically affected by how the government responds.
No ethical prosecutor should ever oppose the pursuit of justice, insofar
as this means ensuring that an innocent person has not been convicted.' To
the extent that this requires disclosure or release of evidence, extant ethical
precepts require this disclosure or release.'6 This truism, however, obscures
the reality of the adversarial system in which an innocence-based postcon-
viction claim is brought and the significance of the prosecutor's response to
and other criminal justice efforts on their provision of postconviction DNA testing.
13. At least thirty-four states have enacted legislation concerning DNA testing issues,
including authorization for postconviction testing, preservation of evidence, payment for test-
ing, andior compensation for the wrongfully convicted. See The Innocence Project, at
http://innocenceproject.orgtlegislation /displaylegislation.php (last visited Apr. 4. 2002).
14. See discussion infra Part III. A-I.
15. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1.1 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2d ed. 1991 ("The
primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished."). See also A.B.A.
STANDARDS FOR CRMIINAL JUSTICE-PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION 3.12(c)
(3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.').
16. See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRPMINALJUSTicE, supra note 15, at 3-3.1 1(a).
A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense,
at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information
which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused
Id. See also A.B.A. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.8(d) (1998) ('The prosecutor
in a criminal case shall... make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or informa-
tion known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the of-
fense.").
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such a claim in that system.'7 The prosecutor, who is accustomed to this ad-
versarial system, can respond to a defendant's postconviction request to sub-
ject "old" evidence to "new" tests in a manner that affects the process in
several ways. The prosecutor 8 can affect the availability of such testing, ei-
ther by successfully opposing testing altogether or through delay to the point
at which testing is no longer feasible 9 or no longer as important." Moreover,
the prosecutor can affect the speed with which such testing is obtained. Fi-
nally, the prosecutor can affect whether the request for "new" testing of
"old" evidence even needs to be subjected to the adversarial process by de-
ciding that collaboration with defense counsel can result in an equally or
more efficient and reliable process.
Prosecutors have met defendants' requests to use new tests on old evi-
dence with a range of reactions. On one end of the spectrum, prosecutors
have assented to, and in some cases assisted with, the locating and testing of
evidence. Some have even instituted programs to independently review cases
for postconviction testing.2' Many of these programs, however, rely upon
prosecutorial judgments concerning which cases will ultimately receive test-
17. Jennifer Boemer, Comment, In the Interest of Justice: Granting Postconviction De-
oxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1971, 1987 (2001).
"Moreover, it's not only the courts that can procedurally bar a defendant's right to postcon-
viction DNA testing, but prosecutors as well." Id.
18. Many of the same observations concerning the effect of the prosecutorial responses
also apply to the response of law enforcement authorities. For instance, evidence retention
and preservation policies can change the availability of tests. To the extent that law enforce-
ment authorities operate under the control of or in cooperation with prosecutors, this is an in-
direct way by which a prosecutor's response to a testing request can affect the availability of
the test. While law enforcement authorities are not independently subject to the same ethical
obligations as prosecutors, prosecutors are constitutionally charged with responsibility for the
actions of law enforcement that affect the defendant's constitutional rights. See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
[While] no one doubts that police investigators sometimes fal to inform a prosecu-
tor of all they know[,]... neither is there any serious doubt that "procedures and
regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor's] burden and to insure
communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals
with it." Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's
Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from dis-
closing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute
the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbi-
ters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.
Id. (citations omitted).
19. Feasibility of tests can be affected by delay if delay results in sufficient degradation
of material for testing.
20. Opposition or delay until a convicted defendant's sentence expires, for example, or
until parole or alternative release is otherwise obtained, could significantly reduce the impor-
tance of the testing.
21. See, e.g., Glenn Puit, Prosecutors Examining Need for DNA Testing in Murder
Cases, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 16, 2001, at 1B; Daniel Wise, Brooklyn Prosecutors Find
Convictions Pass DNA Test, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at 1; Joseph Morton, 3 Prosecutors Get
Behind DNA Testing, OMAHA WoRLD HERALD, Apr. 16, 2001, at 18.
(Vol. 38
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ing.' On the other end of this spectrum, prosecutors have forced defendants
to engage in protracted litigation to obtain the evidence and the tests. This
range of prosecutorial responses is unacceptable. 3 It has been due, at least in
part, to a lack of legal and ethical rules to guide a prosecutor when a defen-
dant requests assistance, oftentimes years after being convicted, in obtaining
evidence to subject to new scientific testing. As the legal rules for obtaining
testing change, so, too, must the ethical obligations of prosecutors who are
necessary participants in the implementation of these rules.
This variety of prosecutorial responses would not be constitutionally
permissible in the pretrial stage of a case, during which prosecutors have
well-established obligations of disclosure to the defendant of exculpatory
test evidence. ' Similarly, in a traditional postconviction action, the prosecu-
tor also has an obligation to disclose exculpatory material.'
Assuming, in the context of these new innocence-based postconviction
claims, that certain defendants should have the opportunity to subject evi-
dence to tests that could demonstrate their actual innocence, there needs to
be recognized, basic ethical obligations for prosecutors facing such requests
as a matter fundamental fairness. While the ethical standards that apply to
prosecutors in the trial and postconviction adversarial context should trans-
late into the innocence-based postconviction context, they do not do so ef-
fortlessly.' We thus provide in this article a model ethical obligation, with
three related standards, that should apply to prosecutors facing an innocence-
based postconviction claim seeking to apply new science or testing to old
evidence in a case.
22. See, e.g., Puit, supra note 21, at lB. See also Wise, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Other commentators have noted this position. See generally Karen Christian. "And
the DNA Shall Set You Free": Issues Surrounding Posiconviction DNA Evidence and the
Pursuit of Innocence, 62 Om-o ST. L.J. 1195, 1195 (2001) ("The author contends that an ad
hoc, case-by-case approach to postconviction testing requests must be abandoned in favor of
statutes that allow defendants to request this testing and receive a hearing if the results arc
favorable.").
24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
25. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (explaining that "after a convic-
tion the prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority
of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the convic-
tion"). See also id. at 447 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the "obligation of the govern-
ment to disclose exculpatory evidence is an exception to the normal operation of an adversary
system of justice").
26. The non-disclosure of "old" evidence that could be subjected to "new" testing, in an
innocence-based postconviction claim, has--in the only case yet to address the matter- been
held not to constitute a Brady violation. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378-79 (4th Cir.
2002).
Harvey does not state a valid Brady claim because he is not challenging a prosecu-
tor's failure to turn over material, exculpatory evidence that, if suppressed, would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Harvey received a fair trial and was given the
opportunity to test the DNA evidence during his trial using the best technology
available at the time.
Id. (citations omitted).
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This article first sets out the range of potential issues that can be liti-
gated by canvassing the requirements of the new state innocence-based post-
conviction review statutes. Each of these issues, ostensibly "settled" by the
relevant testing statute, could spawn litigation, and we explain how different
responses by the prosecutor can affect the significance of these issues. We
then briefly summarize the legal obligations of the prosecutor in the post-
conviction context and explain why limitations on these obligations, which
arise in the traditional postconviction realm, are inapplicable in the inno-
cence-based postconviction context. Next, we identify pressures that
prosecutors face that may affect their responses to a request for postconvic-
tion testing and suggest reasons why postconviction testing is advantageous
for prosecutors, as well as for other stakeholders in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Finally, we set forth a model ethical obligation with three standards that
we believe should be supported by an ethical prosecutor.
II. THE NEW INNOCENCE-BASED POSTCONVICTION REVIEW STATUTES
Scientific developments in forensic DNA analysis have driven legal de-
velopments. There is now an emerging body of law concerning what is-or
in theory should be-available to a convicted defendant, who maintains that
he is factually innocent, in the way of preservation of evidence, scientific
testing, use of public funds for testing, and, in some cases, compensation for
the wrongfully convicted. It is possible to make some general observations
concerning the structure of these laws.
Although these statutes vary in several ways," they all have three basic
components. First, they provide defendants the right to subject evidence to
scientific testing. 8 This "right" is a procedural one with significant substan-
tive consequences. It is procedural in the sense that it is a right to have a type
of test or examination performed, yet it is inextricably bound up with its po-
tential substantive effects: a favorable result for a defendant often means that
substantive relief is warranted. 9 The second basic component of these stat-
27. See discussion infra Part III. A-I.
28. The bulk of these statutes address DNA testing, although some are not restricted to
DNA testing. See, e.g., ILL. CODE CREvI. PROC. § 5/116.3(a) (West 2002) (DNA or finger-
prints); MINN. STAT. § 590.01(la) (2002) (DNA or fingerprints).
29. The substantive consequences of these procedural rights are evident in provisions of
some state statutes that describe the substantive relief defendants receiving favorable tests
may obtain. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2001).
The court may grant a new trial if the person establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable trier of fact, considering the evidence presented at
trial, evidence that was available at trial but was not presented or was excluded,
and the evidence obtained pursuant to subsection (a) of this section would have
convicted the person.
Id.
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utes is that they create requirements for what the defendant must show con-
cerning the state of the evidence to be tested (i.e., demonstration of adequate
authentication and/or chain of custody)? Third, these statutes condition the
right to test on a showing of the evidentiary significance of a favorable test
result, or, in other words, what a test result must demonstrate in the factual
context of a given case.' Many of these statutes also provide for appoint-
ment of counsel, mandate preservation of evidence, and/or require that the
defendant explain the prior failure to test.
These statutes provide the means for obtaining postconviction review,
and potentially relief, but they are not traditional postconviction relief stat-
utes (such as those governing writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis). Al-
though they sometimes use the language of traditional postconviction or ha-
beas corpus law, they differ from those bodies of law in at least three
important respects. First, perhaps most significantly, the innocence-based
postconviction statutes are all premised on a single, specific, substantive
claim by the defendant: that he or she is factually innocent 2 In traditional
forms of postconviction relief, such as petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
there may be a potentially infinite variety of substantive claims (i.e., the peti-
tioner is being held in violation of any constitutional or federal statutory
right), but factual innocence is neither required33 nor is itself an independ-
At least as classically understood, it is not a right of procedural due process. And
neither is it a typical substantive due process right. But it is a right that legitimately
draws upon the principles that underlay all of these[.]
Harvey, 285 F.3d at 311 (Luttig, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a)(4) (2001).
31. Washington's statute appears to be an exception, with no mention of such require-
ments. See WASH. REy. CODE § 10.73.170 (2001).
32. One innocence-based postconviction testing statute makes clear that the postconvic-
tion remedy it affords is exclusive. MIzN,. STAT. § 590.01, Subd. 2 (2002):
This remedy takes the place of any other common law, statutory or other remedies
which may have been available for challenging the validity of a conviction, sen-
tence, or other disposition and must be used exclusively in place of them unless it
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the conviction, sentence or other
disposition.
33. Some have suggested that a claim of innocence should be a prerequisite of a habeas
petition. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970). The Court has never held this, although
some justices have advocated such a requirement. In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217.
232-33 (1969), Justice Black's dissenting opinion stated: "Of course one important factor that
would relate to whether conviction should be vulnerable to [federal] collateral attack is the
possibility of the applicant's innocence." Justice Black also observed that: "In collateral at-
tacks whether by habeas corpus or by § 2255 proceedings, I would always require that the
convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt
on his guilt." Id at 242. However, Justice Harlan distanced himself from "any implications
that the availability of this collateral remedy turns on a petitioner's assertion that he was in
fact innocent, or on the substantiality of such an allegation." Id. (citations omitted).
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ently significant basis for relief." Second, innocence-based postconviction
statutes forego many of the procedural requirements that have become hall-
marks of traditional postconviction litigation, such as strict time bars," limi-
tations upon collateral relief arising from procedural default at trial, 6 and
limits on successive petitions.37 They are explicitly designed to reach--rather
than avoid--the merits of the claim.38 As such, they create a process for re-
view that circumvents the principle of finality.39 Third, unlike any other
means of enforcing rights in the criminal justice system, these statutes pro-
vide postconviction review specifically as the result of scientific tests."'
34. While actual innocence can in theory be a basis for a habeas petition under Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993), typically the claim of innocence is merely a way to
avoid a procedural bar. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995) ("procedural" claim
of innocence can be a gateway through which other constitutional claims that would be pro-
cedurally barred can be heard under "miscarriage of justice" exception). The Court has long
explained the fundamental justification for collateral remedies as the protection of constitu-
tional rights, rather than error correction in the determination of guilt or sentencing. See
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 229, 226 (1969) ("The provision of federal collateral
remedies rests more fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitu-
tional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a
mechanism for relief.").
35. The filing periods under these statutes vary widely. They range from a relatively
short period in the context of development of "new" science or technology to an unlimited
period. Compare DEL. CODE Ai. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2001) (within three years after judgment
of conviction became final) and FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11 (1)(b) (2001) (within two years of fi-
nality of judgment and sentence, affirmance on direct appeal, or entry of collateral counsel,
unless facts could not have been ascertained through due diligence) with ARIZ. REv. STAT. §
13-4240(K) (2002) (relief exists "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law that would bar
a hearing as untimely"); ARK. CODE § 16-1 12-202(a)(1) (Michie 2001) (motion may be filed
"[e]xcept when direct appeal is available").
36. See Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 87 (1977) (requirement that habeas peti-
tioner show cause and prejudice for procedural default).
37. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (habeas petitioner's failure to in-
clude claim in successor petition that could have been brought in prior petition constitutes
abuse of the writ).
38. Senate Bill 486, for example, specifically provides that in federal cases the applica-
tion for innocence-based postconviction testing shall not itself be considered a "motion," tin-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2255, for purposes of the bar on successive petitions, and that favorable test
results shall result in a hearing and orders "notwithstanding any provision of law that would
bar such hearing or orders as untimely." Act § 102, ch. 156, § 2291. The provisions for state
postconviction testing in Senate Bill 486 also require that state laws allow a person whose test
results are favorable "to apply for postconviction relief, notwithstanding any provision of law
that would bar such application as untimely." Id. § 103(a)(1). Efforts to obtain testing through
federal court have sometimes been found to be habeas petitions, subject to the procedural re-
quirements those carry, notwithstanding defendants' claims to the contrary. See Harvey v.
Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002).
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(m) (West 2002):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the right to file a motion for postcon-
viction DNA testing provided by this section is absolute and shall not be waived.
This prohibition applies to, but is not limited to, a waiver that is given as part of an
agreement resulting in a plea of guilty or nolo contendre.
40. While scientific evidence is often admitted in support of a claim that a defendant is
entitled to relief (e.g., evidence of a defendant's IQ is often admitted to demonstrate he could
[Vol. 38
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IR. BASIC PROCEDURAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES IN POSTCONVICTION
REQUESTS FOR APPLYING NEW SCIENCE TO OLD EVIDENCE
The application of newly created or newly advanced science to extant,
or "old" evidence, presents issues similar to those involving newly discov-
ered evidence.4 Many, but not all jurisdictions, allow defendants to bring a
motion for a new trial or action for postconviction relief based on evidence
that was not or could not have been discovered before trial.' The application
of new science presents an example of evidence that could not have been
discovered before trial because of the limits of scientific or technological
methodology. When the "new" science is applied to the "old" evidence, the
results may be newly discovered evidence and may be a basis for postcon-
viction relief.3 It is also quite possible that the results reveal no newly dis-
not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver), the only other situation in which a scientific
test necessarily results in legal relief in the criminal justice system is arguably the evaluation
of a criminal defendant's competence to stand trial. In those cases, the results of the forensic
evaluations are the basis for enforcing the right not to be tried while incompetent. See gener-
ally Dusky v. U.S., 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961) and Pate v. Robinson. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
In the innocence-based postconviction claim, the scientific test is a necessary prerequisite for
relief, whereas it is not a prerequisite, for example, to a finding that a defendant is not compe-
tent to stand trial.
41. Many of the innocence-based postconviction testing statutes mirror the requirements
for newly discovered evidence to be the basis for a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 33. See, e.g., United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 467 (3d Cir. 2001).
These requirements include:
(a) the evidence must be in fact newly discovered, i.e., discovered since
trial;
(b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the
part of the movant;
(c) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching;
(d) it must be material to the issues involved; and
(e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly
discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.
Id (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 33).
42. Michael J. Muskat, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath of
Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence
Claims Through State Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. Rnv. 131, 158-60 (1996) (noting
in 1996 that at most only forty-one states provided post-conviction relief mechanisms that
would be useable for claim of actual innocence).
43. One state's innocence-based postconviction testing statute makes this explicit. See,
e.g., Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing)
Amendment to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140 & 9.141, 807 So. 2d 633, 635
(2001) ("A motion to vacate filed under rule 3.850 or a motion for postconviction or collateral
relief filed under rule 3.851, which is based solely on the results of the court-ordered DNA
testing obtained under this rule, shall be treated as raising a claim of newly-discovered evi-
dence ... ").
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covered evidence (if they are inconclusive), or the results may confirm the
petitioner's guilt.
A series of issues arise whenever "new" science may be applied to "old"
evidence. These issues are not limited to innocence-based postconviction
claims, or efforts to obtain DNA testing, but are issues concerning the gen-
eral application of new, or newly available, science to old evidence in crimi-
nal cases. The new innocence-based postconviction statutes address these is-
sues, and we briefly examine how they do so. We identify these issues not to
resolve them but to outline the range of areas in which the prosecutor's re-
sponse matters.
A. Application of Statutes of Limitation or Procedural Bars
Many states dramatically limit the time in which criminal defendants
may challenge, by a motion for a new trial, their convictions in a trial court."
As the Court noted in 1993,' only nine states do not limit the time in which
a motion for new trial may be brought. 6 A defendant's ability to bring these
actions is typically further limited by a requirement that the defendant either
raised, and preserved, the issue at trial or can justify or explain the failure to
do so."
Application of these time limits could present potentially insurmount-
able hurdles with respect to requests for postconviction testing. If the science
does not evolve sufficiently during the limitations period, the defendant
would be time-barred from pursuing testing. The time-barred defendant must
then present his claim as a traditional motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, which creates a new set of issues concerning when the
44. ALA. CODE § 15-17-5(a) (2001) (30 days); ARIz. R. CRIM. P.24.2(a) (2002) (60 days);
ARK. R. CR1I. P.33.3(b) (2001) (30 days); FLA. R. CRIM. P.3.590 (2002) (10 days); HAW. R.
PENAL P.33 (2000) (10 days); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 725(b) (2001) (30 days); IND. R.
CRIM. P.16 (2001) (30 days); MICH. CT. R. CRIM. P.6.431(A)(1) (2001) (42 days); MINN. R.
CRIM. P.26.04(3) (2001) (15 days); Mo. R. CRIM. P.29.11(b) (2001) (15-25 days); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-16-702(2) (2001) (30 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-29-1 (2001) (10
days); TENN. R. CRIM. P.33(b) (2002) (30 days); TEX. R. APP. P.31.4(a) (2001) (15 days);
UTAH R. CRIM. P.24(c) (2001) (10 days); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15(B) (2001) (21 days); Wis.
STAT. § 809.30(2)(b) (2001) (20 days).
45. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 nn. 8-11 (1993).
46. Footnotes in the Herrera case list the statutes from the nine states.
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1181(8) (West 1985) (no time limit); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 33 (Supp.
1992) (no time limit); GA. CODE ANN. 5-5-40, 5-5-41 (1982) (30 days, can be extended);
IDAHO CODE 19-2407 (Supp. 1992) (14 days, can be extended); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 23 (1993)
(45 days, can be waived); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 10.06 (1983) (one year, can be waived); MASS. R.
CRIM. PRoc. 30 (1979) (no time limit); N.J. R. CRI3M. PRAc. 3:20-2 (1993) (no time limit);
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. 440.10(l)(g) (McKinney 1983) (no time limit); N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-
1415(b)(6) (1988) (no time limit); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(A)(6), (B) (1988) (120 days. can be
waived); ORE. REV. STAT. 136.535 (1991) (five days, can be waived); PA. R. CRIM. P.
1123(d) (1992) (no time limit); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 29(b) (Supp. 1991) (no time limit); W.VA. R.
CRIM. P. 33 (1992) (no time limit). Id.
47. For example, by showing that the evidence was newly discovered.
[Vol. 38
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science or testing became "available" or was "discovered," and/or when it
became admissible in the jurisdiction. This also raises factual questions con-
cerning when the existence of the evidence became known, or could have
become known, to the defendant. Some testing statutes address this issue by
explicitly exempting postconviction relief based upon newly available test-
ing from such time bars," while others impose no time limits on when test-
ing can be obtained. 9
The issues concerning when a methodology became "available" or was
discovered, and factual issues concerning what was known about it or about
the evidence, could significantly complicate an application for testing.
Whether the defendant knew or should have known about the existence of
testing may raise issues of ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e., whether
counsel, had he or she been effective, would have known of the availability
of the tests), as well as issues of prosecutorial disclosure of the evidence.
B. Offense or Penalty-Specific Limitation on Applicability
Some jurisdictions limit the circumstances under which defendants may
bring innocence-based postconviction claims to those in which they were
convicted of certain offenses, suffered certain penalties," or are still subject
to the sentence originally imposed.5 Statutes include offenses that range
from a general description of "felonies" to specific enumerated offenses.' A
few jurisdictions do not limit access of testing by either type of offense or
48. See, e.g., Apiz. Rv. STAT. § 13-4240(K) (2002).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law that would bar a hearing as untimely,
if the results of the postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid testing are favorable to
the petitioner, the court shall order a hearing and make any further orders that are
required pursuant to this article or the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id; Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing)
Amendment to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140 & 9.141, 807 So. 2d 633. 635,
639-40 (2001). One jurisdiction makes innocence-based postconviction testing, when chosen,
the defendant's exclusive form of relief. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01, subd. 2 (2001) ("This
remedy takes the place of any other common law, statutory or other remedies which may have
been available for challenging the validity of a conviction, sentence, or other disposition and
must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective to test the le-
gality of the conviction, sentence or other disposition.").
49. See, e.g., TENN. CODEANN. § 40-30-403 (2002) (no time limit).
50. Many jurisdictions' testing procedures apply only to felony convictions. See. e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(a) (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A) (West 2002).
Some jurisdictions allow testing only for certain, more serious convictions. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-38-7-1 (West 2001) (murder and class A, B, or C felonies); ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 15, § 2137 (2002) (any crime punishable by 20 years incarceration or more).
51. See, e.g., CAL- PENAL CODE § 1405(a) (West 2002) (defendant must still be incarcer-
ated); ME. R-v. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2002) (requires defendant be "in actual execution of a
sentence of imprisonment or... [be] subject to a sentence of imprisonment that is to be
served in the future because another sentence must be served first"); WASH. REv. CODE AN.
§ 10.73.170(1) (West 2002) (felony conviction and serving term of imprisonment).
52. See supra note 50.
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penalty. 3 It is important to recognize that even after release from incarcera-
tion, a convicted defendant faces significant continuing disabilities.' It
should be relatively straightforward to determine whether a defendant satis-
fies the offense or sentence-based prerequisite for bringing a motion for
postconviction testing. The speed of the prosecutor's response, however,
could certainly affect whether the testing can occur during the pendency of
the sentence, and therefore the availability of testing under certain statutes.
C. Pleading Requirements
Even with a provision authorizing testing, some formal pleading is re-
quired to begin the process. Testing statutes require varying degrees of
specificity and formality for this document (i.e., motion, oath, verification,
etc.). The degree to which prosecutors raise procedural shortcomings in the
formality of the required pleading can delay the testing.
D. Evidence Authentication Requirements
Almost all jurisdictions that permit testing require some showing about
the authenticity of the evidence the defendant seeks to test. 6 This involves
procedural questions concerning who bears the burden of demonstrating au-
thenticity and by what standard. Some statutes require that the evidence be
in the possession or control of the court or other state officials. Other stat-
utes require that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the evidence
has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material
respect."8 At least one requires a finding about the degree of possible degra-
53. See, e.g., Mn',1N. STAT. ANN. ch. 590.01, subd. 1(2) (2001) (except when direct appeal
is pending, anyone "convicted of a crime who claims that... scientific evidence not available
at trial... establishes [their] actual innocence may apply").
54. See supra note 3.
55. See, e.g., VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-327.1(B) (2001):
[P]etitioner shall assert categorically and with specificity, under oath, the facts to
support the items enumerated in subsection A and (i) the crime for which the per-
son was convicted, (ii) the reason or reasons the evidence was not known or tested
by the time the conviction became final in the circuit court, and (iii) the reason or
reasons that the newly discovered or untested evidence may prove the actual inno-
cence of the person convicted.
56. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2002) ("the evi-
dence... (ii) has been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not
been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material respect"); UTAHi CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-301(2)(b) (2001) ("the chain of custody is sufficient to establish that the evi-
dence has not been altered in any material aspect"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(ii)
(2001) ("the evidence is subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that the evidence
has not been altered, tampered with, or substituted in any way").
57. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-4240(A) (Michie 2001).
58. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(b)(2) (Michie 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1405(f)(2) (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4504(a)(4) (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
[Vol. 38
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss2/4
2002] PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATIONS IN POSTCONVICTION INNOCENCE CLAIMS 403
dation of the evidence." Although reliability of the evidence is necessary to
obtain an accurate result, it should not present a legitimate issue when evi-
dence has been in the custody of government officials. Nevertheless, prose-
cutors could demand that the defendant establish a chain of custody stretch-
ing over decades, through offices and personnel who are clearly beyond his
control.'
E. Requirement of an Explanation for Prior Lack of Testing
To ensure that defendants diligently pursue available testing, some
states require defendants to explain the failure to have previously conducted
testing.6' Typically this requires that the defendant demonstrate that the
method of testing was either unavailable at the time of trial or has signifi-
cantly improved since that time.' A few statutes provide that lack of avail-
38-7-8 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRoc. § 8-201(c)(3) (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN,. §
590.01(la)(2)(b)(2) (2002); TEx. CRim. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Vernon
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(2)(b) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(ii)
(2001).
59. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(7)(b) (2002):
That the identified biological material was collected, handled, and preserved by
procedures that allow the court to find that the identified biological material is not
contaminated or is not so degraded that the DNA profile of the tested sample of the
identified biological material cannot be determined to be identical to the DNA pro-
file of the sample initially collected during the investigation described in subsec-
tion (1).
Id-
60. One state statute recognizes this possibility and requires that state agencies cooperate
in determining chain of custody. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(5) (2001) ("After a peti-
tion is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and crime laboratory
personnel have a duty to cooperate in preserving evidence and in determining the sufficiency
of the chain of custody of the evidence which may be subject to DNA testing.").
61. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(a)(l)(B) (Michie 2001) ("he evidence was
not subject to the testing because either the technology for the testing was not available at the
time of the trial or the testing was not available as evidence at the time of the trial."). See also
IND. CODE § 35-38-7-8(3) (2001):
The evidence sought to be tested:
(A) was not previously tested; or
(B) was tested, but the requested DNA testing and analysis will:
i) provide results that are reasonably more discriminating and probative of
the identity of the perpetrator or accomplice; or
ii) have a reasonable probability of contradicting prior test results.
62- See, e.g., DEa. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)(2) (2001) ("The evidence was not previ-
ously subject to testing because the technology for testing was not available at the time of the
trial."); MtCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 770.16(3)(b)(ii) (2002) ("The identified biological mate-
rial described in subsection (1) was not previously subjected to DNA testing or. if previously
15
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ability of the evidence to counsel, or lack of knowledge concerning its exis-
tence, without regard to technological change, is sufficient.6' Whether evi-
dence was available, or known to the defendant or counsel, are of course
questions that prosecutors may raise as a litigable issue.
F. Explanation of Potential Significance of Testing
As both a procedural and substantive matter, establishing the eviden-
tiary significance of favorable test results is one of the most important issues
in obtaining testing. It is also one that can easily be the most contentious.
Procedurally, this issue involves the standard by which the defendant must
demonstrate the potential "favorability" of the test result as a prerequisite to
obtaining testing.' Substantively, this issue implicates issues of finality and
availability of collateral relief more generally. Should it be enough that a test
result is favorable simply by not inculpating the defendant? Should there be
a requirement that if the test result had been in evidence at the time of the
defendant's trial, there would very likely have been a different result?' Or
should it be sufficient that, had the test result been in evidence, there possi-
bly would have been a different result?' Does a "favorable" result include
one that would reduce, without eliminating, the defendant's responsibility in
the offense?
The statutes do not provide a uniform answer to these questions, and the
answers that they do provide seem to beckon disputes about their meaning.
A significant number of statutes require that identity was at issue in the
case67 or that it should have been if it was not. 8 Some statutes require the de-
tested, will be subject to DNA testing technology that was not available when the defendant
was convicted."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (A)(i) (2001) ("the evidence was not known or
available at the time the conviction became final in the circuit court or the evidence was not
previously subjected to testing because the testing procedure was not available at the Division
of Forensic Science at the time the conviction became final in the circuit court"). See also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (Michie 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11(2)(a)(2) (2001).
63. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 547.035(3)(b) -(c) (2002).
64. Compare, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-I(C) (Michie 2001) (clear and convincing
evidence) with CR1vI. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 64.03 (2) (Vernon 2002) (preponderance of the
evidence).
65. The standard for the allowance of a new trial on collateral review, based upon insuf-
ficiency of the evidence at trial, is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19
(1979) (a new trial is appropriate only when, viewing evidence in light most favorable to
prosecution, no reasonable finder of fact could have concluded defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt). See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-1(C)(8) (Michie 2001) (petitioner must
demonstrate "if the evidence he wants the court to order DNA testing upon had been admitted
at the petitioner's initial trial, a reasonable judge or jury would not have been able to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt").
66. See, e.g., N.Y. CRMI. PRoc. LAW § 440.10(l)(g) (Consol. 2001) (new trial available
if evidence "is of such character as to create a probability that had such evidence been re-
ceived at trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.").
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fendant to show that the testing would produce results that are "materially
relevant" to a defendant's claim of innocence.' Others require the defendant
to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
been prosecuted or convicted had the test results been available," or that the
verdict or sentence would have been more favorable if the results had been
available." One statute requires the defendant to show that the test results
would establish his "actual innocence."' Others require new, noncumulative
evidence that would be "material to a claim of innocence."' Yet others spec-
ify nothing about the required evidentiary significance of test results."'
G. Requirement and Duration of a Claim of Innocence
The procedures for testing in innocence-based postconviction actions,
by definition, involve the claim that the defendant is innocent. Must the de-
fendant have asserted his innocence throughout the case, or is it sufficient
that the defendant has raised his innocence only for purposes of the postcon-
viction action?75 For example, prosecutors may assert that defendants who
confessed or who plead guilty cannot obtain postconviction testing. How-
ever, absent an explicit statutory bar, the recency of a claim of innocence
should not provide a basis for a prosecutor to oppose testing.
H. Cost Issues
Whether the defendant or the government should bear the costs of test-
ing is a critical issue because it can either facilitate or preclude testing.
Various statutes allocate the costs of testing differently. In addition to allo-
cating the costs of testing, some statutes provide for the appointment of
counsel, the availability of which may also either facilitate or preclude test-
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(f)(3) (West 2002).
69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(c)(1)(B) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE A'N.
tit. 11, § 4504 (a)(5) (2001); MD. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 8-201(c)(5) (2001).
70. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240(b)(1) (2002).
71. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 1405(f)(5) (West 2002).
72. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.l(C)(1) (2002).
73. Arkansas' testing provision requires that the defendant establish a prima facie case
that "[t]he testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materi-
ally relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence[.]" ARK. CODE A.,N. § 16-112-
202(c)(1)(B) (Michie 2001). Minnesota's provision is nearly identical. MiNN. STAT. ANN. §
590.01 Subd-l(c)(2) (2002) ("the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncu-
mulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence").
74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001); TE3NN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-403
(2002).
75. See, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 64.03(b) (2002), for example. provides
that: "A convicted person who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere in the case may submit a
motion under this chapter, and the convicting court is prohibited from finding that identity
was not an issue in the case solely on the basis of that plea."
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ing. These issues unfortunately present a ripe opportunity for litigation, with
the obvious consequence of delay.
L Scientific Reliability Issues
An unspoken premise of these new testing provisions is that the forms
of testing available are so reliable that they necessarily represent an im-
provement in what was available earlier in the case. But how reliable must a
"new" form of testing, that a defendant seeks to apply to "old" evidence, be?
Some of the new innocence-based postconviction statutes provide only for
DNA testing, although many provide for any testing that is scientifically re-
liable and was not previously used in the case.
Prosecutors can decide to make each of these issues the subject of litiga-
tion. The resolution of such litigation may be rapid or protracted. In addition,
the factual predicates for resolution of many of these issues are often within
the control of prosecutors, which means that the decisions they make can
shape not only the process, but also the outcome. Unless there is an ethical
obligation on the part of the prosecution to promptly resolve all of these is-
sues in a way that facilitates justice, the promise of exonerating those who
legitimately claim that they were wrongfully convicted will be hollow.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING ETHICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
TO THE INNOCENCE-BASED POSTCONVICTION CONTEXT
The principal legal obligations of prosecutors, with respect to ensuring
the fairness of the trial process, are constitutionally based. They involve a
range of obligations, all of which may be relevant to an innocence-based
postconviction testing claim. These obligations "might loosely be called the
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence."76 These obligations
include:
(1) the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence within its possession or
control that is exculpatory and material;
(2) the prohibition against the government's bad faith destruction of
such evidence;
(3) the state's duty to provide the defense with the power through sub-
poena to gain the production of witnesses and physical items at trial;
(4) the state's duty to provide certain types of assistance or information
to the defense that will allow it to use the power of subpoena to gain evi-
dence; and
76. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (citing United States v. Valenzuela-
Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
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(5) the prohibition against certain governmental actions that interfere
with the defense use of the subpoena power.'
All of these obligations could conceivably become significant in an in-
nocence-based claim for postconviction testing. For example, if the evidence
to be tested is in the prosecution's control or possession, and a favorable test
result would be material to the defendant's claim of innocence, it would fall
within the disclosure requirements of Brady. Similarly, information about
the existence or location of this evidence would appear to be the type of as-
sistance the government must provide to enable the defense to subpoena the
evidence for testing. Not interfering with such subpoenas or other efforts to
obtain the evidence would necessarily be a part of this obligation as well.
Preservation of evidence that might be tested also appears to be a prosecuto-
rial obligation that is significant in innocence-based postconviction testing.
Although innocence-based claims for postconviction testing appear to
implicate all these obligations, such claims do not readily implicate existing
legal obligations, either for disclosure by prosecutors or access to evidence
by defendants, for two basic reasons. The first of these reasons is doctrinal,
and the second is procedural.
First, innocence-based claims for postconviction review are premised on
the notion that the trial result was factually incorrect, not that the trial proc-
ess was somehow unfair. The existing constitutional obligations for prosecu-
tors to disclose evidence or information,7 and existing constitutional rights
of defendants to gain access to evidence or information," have all been based
on the constitutional guarantee of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' As such, they are premised on the notion that a trial may be rendered
unfair by the failure to disclose evidence, or the denial of access to evi-
dence.8 The unfairness in the innocence-based postconviction claim, how-
77. WAYNER. LAFAvEET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3, at 1096 (3d ed. 2000).
78. See Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 432-33
(1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 107 (1976); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
79. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (describing "what might loosely be
called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence"); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
80. The exception to this is found in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, in which the Court sug-
gested that the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment might afford a basis for
obtaining counseling records of a witness, but held that the issue was "more properly ... con-
sidered by reference to due process." 480 U.S. at 56.
81. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that:
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution....
The principle.., is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused[,] .... [s]ociety wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administra-
tion of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.
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ever, is not a claim of past unfairness at the trial level, but rather that there is
present unfairness at the postconviction level. Although as a common sense
matter, it is easy enough to recognize that present denial of access to evi-
dence that could exonerate a convicted person is fundamentally unfair, this is
not the same as concluding that the trial was unfair. The Court has been
careful to avoid creating constitutionally freestanding discovery require-
ments in criminal cases,n and the recognition that a defendant should have
access to evidence, or be able to obtain information, that could support a
claim of innocence need not amount to a constitutional right of discovery.
Second, there are a number of procedural limitations on traditional post-
conviction review that are based upon concerns that are inapplicable in the
innocence-based postconviction context. These include limitations on collat-
eral remedies, such as procedural default,83 limitations on successive peti-
tions," and limitations on discovery, 85 which are a function of the finality
and comity concerns of the collateral review process generally. These limita-
tions do not apply with the same force to innocence-based postconviction
claims, because this form of review carves out a limited exception to finality
(in an effort to obtain a more accurate result) and because--as collateral
Id. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) ("The constitutional error, if
any, in this case was the Government's failure to assist the defense by disclosing information
that might have been helpful in conducting the cross-examination.... [S]uch suppression of
evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair
trial."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) ("prosecutor will not have violated
his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result
in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial"). More recently, in Kyles v. Whitely, 514
U.S. 419, 434 (1995), the Court decided that:
Although the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact of favorable
but undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not require demonstration
by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reason-
able doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the
defendant).
Id. See also Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) (finding no prejudice at trial when
the defendant could not show with a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence
would have been different if the materials had been disclosed").
82. See Weathersford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.").
83. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977).
84. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (explaining that finality is the source of
the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine as a limit on successive petitions, because "[flinality has spe-
cial importance in the context of a federal attack on a state conviction[,] ... [r]eexamination
of state convictions on federal habeas 'frustrate[s] . . . 'both the States' sovereign power to
punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights"') (internal cita-
tions omitted).
85. LAFAVEETAL., supra note 77, § 28.7(e), at 1349. "Rule 6 of the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases allows discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 'if, and to the extent
that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do
so.' Id. (citing Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases). Indeed, "[g]eneralized state-
ments about the possible existence of material do not constitute "'good cause."' Id.
(Vol. 38
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state proceedings--they do not implicate comity. This form of review is lim-
ited in that it opens only a specific area of inquiry concerning the validity of
the conviction (typically identification), and does so for the sole purpose of
seeking the truth.
Thus, while in traditional postconviction proceedings defendants seek to
demonstrate that past unfairness led to injustice, in innocence-based post-
conviction proceedings defendants seek the factual truth. Because the pur-
pose of innocence-based postconviction proceedings more closely mirrors
the purpose of a trial, the principal ethical and legal obligations of a prosecu-
tor that are relevant to postconviction testing in support of an innocence-
based postconviction claim should be those that apply at trial, rather than
those that typically apply in the postconviction context.
V. FACTORS AFFECTING PROSECUTORS' RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR
POSTCONVICTION TESTING
There are individual and institutional pressures that may deter prosecu-
tors from cooperating with a defendant's request for postconviction testing.
For instance, the individual prosecutor faces institutional and public pressure
to maintain the integrity of a conviction. The number of convictions obtained
may be a measure of a prosecutor's individual success or failure. ' Prosecu-
tors may be perceived as being "soft" on crime or sympathetic towards de-
fendants if they assist with, or fail to object to, postconviction testing. On a
personal level, prosecutors may have worked with victims and investigators
of horrific crimes, and may be loathe to reopen unsettling experiences.
Prosecutors may themselves be invested in the knowledge or belief that the
perpetrator has been punished and the case concluded.
In addition to these personal and institutional pressures, postconviction
challenges undermine both theoretical and practical notions of finality. In a
theoretical sense, finality is necessary to maintain the legitimacy and integ-
rity of the criminal justice system. In a practical sense, victims of violent
crime seek finality as a way of promoting closure. A defendant's postconvic-
tion request for scientific tests threatens to undermine both types of finality,
which adds to the resistance to such testing.
As the Court has noted, however, with regard to federal habeas corpus
claims, "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be
permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity
for.., judicial review" and that "[c]onventional notions of finality of litiga-
tion have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of consti-
86. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, it is how You
Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?. 38
CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 292 (2001).
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tutional rights is alleged. ' '87 If the "conventional notion of finality" can be set
aside when the infringement of constitutional rights is alleged for exercising
federal collateral review, surely a state should be able to set it aside in the
narrow context of examining a claim of factual innocence.
VI. PROPOSED MODEL ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR PROSECUTORS FACING A
POSTCONVICTION REQUEST FOR APPLICATION OF NEW TESTING
While it is impossible to canvas the entire range of potential arguments
in response to a defendant's request for the application of new scientific test-
ing to evidence, several basic principles could guide an ethical response to
such request. These are not designed to ensure a particular outcome or ad-
vantage, or disadvantage, for either side. Rather, they are intended to effi-
ciently, reliably, and fairly ensure access to the most accurate assessment of
all potential evidence to provide the fullest possible accounting of the truth
in a particular case.
A. Obligation to Promptly Seek Fullest Possible Accounting of the Truth
The postconviction phase of a criminal case presents an effective role-
reversal for the respective parties. The presumptions and burdens are the re-
verse of those in the investigative and trial phases of a case, and thus the ac-
tions of counsel must reflect this difference. Before conviction, when the
government bears the burden of proof and the defendant enjoys the presump-
tion of innocence, delays in the process may advantage the defendant. De-
fendants are constitutionally guaranteed a speedy trial, and defendants who
are incarcerated pending trial suffer dramatic costs associated with delays.
From a strategic perspective, however, delay can advantage a defendant who
is not obligated to present witnesses or establish proof.
In the postconviction context, the reverse is true. The defendant bears
the burden of proof, and all presumptions favor the government. Delay ad-
vantages the government because it preserves the defendant's conviction and
incarceration. Delay in the postconviction context also reduces the likelihood
of finding extant evidence that may be subjected to testing. The possibility
that delay will result in degradation or destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence should give a prosecutor pause, and perhaps it should mean that a
prosecutor will not raise a procedural argument against a defendant's effort
to obtain testing in the first instance, based on the possible ramifications of
the delay caused by such an argument.
The obligation to seek the fullest possible accounting of the truth does
not, by itself, reflect a belief that the original conviction is either invalid or
incorrect. Nor does it reflect an admission of the evidentiary or legal signifi-
cance of potential evidence. Thus, a prosecutor must make decisions about
87. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969).
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the process of locating and identifying evidence that might be subject to test-
ing, and subjecting it to testing, without being influenced by the possible
evidentiary or legal significance of the results of such tests.
This obligation also means that strategic or legal reliance on the princi-
ple of finality must not preclude exploring the existence of potentially exon-
erative evidence. Finality as a legal proposition is necessary to maintain the
legitimacy and integrity of the criminal justice system.rn As a practical mat-
ter, finality is an essential component of enabling crime victims to obtain
closure, ensuring that there will be certainty that comes with the end of liti-
gation, and allowing a defendant to focus on rehabilitation and reentry into
society. Finality, though, is premised on the notion that the correct individual
was held responsible for the offense.
The obligation to seek the fullest possible accounting of the truth means
that prosecutors must be committed to obtaining test results from qualified
persons who operate reliable testing facilities, according to accepted proce-
dures. The obligation to seek this accounting means that the prosecution
must either affirmatively seek, or passively accept, the use of such a facility,
and will not interpose spurious arguments about the qualifications of a par-
ticular scientist or facility solely to hinder testing. For instance, state or po-
lice facilities may not be best suited to conduct such testing, either because
of prior involvement in a case, lack of the requisite sophistication, or a back-
log of more recent cases. Private facilities, because of experience, expertise,
neutrality, or speed, may be better suited to undertake such testing."
B. Obligation to Effect Full Disclosure in Completed Cases
The prosecutor bears a constitutional and ethical obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence prior to the conviction, and there is no principled rea-
son that this obligation should not apply at the postconviction stage. Indeed,
after conviction, a defendant typically may use a jurisdiction's public re-
cords law to obtain substantially all the documents in his case, not just those
that are "exculpatory." More importantly, however, the access of a postcon-
viction defendant to information about the case must be greater than access
to basic exculpatory information because information that did not seem sig-
nificant at the time of the conviction can become paramount as the result of a
particular scientific advance. For instance, information concerning the avail-
ability of previously non-exculpatory, irrelevant evidence that the prosecu-
tion or police chose not to use at the time of trial may become significant if
advances in testing make it possible to subject that evidence to testing. This
88. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1998) (noting that finality is es-
sential to the retributive and deterrent functions of the criminal law).
89. Examples of such arguments include those that an out-of-state lab will not be under
prosecution's "control," or will preclude subsequent establishment of chain of custody for
items analyzed there. Some state testing statutes provide for just such use of private testing
facilities. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-301(7) (a) & (b) (2001).
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is not classic exculpatory evidence, yet the nondisclosure of the existence of
such information or evidence effectively results in the suppression of poten-
tially exculpatory evidence.
Nevertheless, prosecutors sometimes take the position that a postconvic-
tion effort to obtain the application of new science constitutes a reopening of
the criminal case and thus makes it an "ongoing" or "pending" case. Once a
defendant has been convicted for a particular crime, a prosecutor should not
be allowed to argue persuasively that it is still an "open" case in response to
the defendant's request for access to the government's information. Of
course, there are legitimate exceptions to this obligation. For instance, iden-
tifying or personal information concerning victims or witnesses should not
be disclosed absent some compelling reason that it could affect the availabil-
ity of testing. Similarly, once information is developed that exonerates an
individual, specific details that might compromise the government's ability
to locate and prosecute the actual perpetrator should not be subject to disclo-
sure.
C. Obligation to Utilize Most Accurate Scientific Methods
The use of the most accurate scientific methods increases the effective-
ness of the truth-finding process, which is a primary goal of the criminal jus-
tice system. Legal finality based on a factual premise whose falsity is scien-
tifically demonstrable is simply not genuine finality. This is the underlying
premise of innocence-based postconviction review.
The desire for truth-finding, however, must be balanced against the
practical need for finality. A never-ending obligation to utilize the most ac-
curate scientific methods could result in the permanent sacrifice of legal fi-
nality on the altar of ever-expanding scientific development. The requisite
degree of reliability of scientific evidence can be cabined between two poles.
At a minimum, a defendant should be able to use the science that local
prosecutors use in current cases. The rationale for this "floor" is that if the
science is sufficiently reliable for the prosecutors to use to obtain convic-
tions, it is sufficiently reliable in the postconviction context. At a maximum,
a defendant should be able to use scientific tests that are admissible in the
highest court of the jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has presented three ethical obligations that should apply to
prosecutors faced with an innocence-based postconviction request for test-
ing. These obligations are designed to make real the promise of postconvic-
tion testing statutes that offer a means of establishing the innocence of
wrongfully convicted persons. While the existence of these statutes is a criti-
cal step in ensuring that wrongful convictions are corrected, unless prosecu-
tors adopt ethical obligations consistent with the premises of these new stat-
utes, their promise will likely never be fulfilled.
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